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In the following response to Menashe Schwed’s insightful paper, I want to: echo 
what I see is one key point in slightly different terms; raise one question; and close 
with a reiteration of a second of the project’s key points, together with a speculative 
extension. 
 Schwed’s work is significant in that it asks those who have put forward 
conceptions of argument as a practice to take their own theories more seriously. 
Take Ralph Johnson’s Manifest Rationality (2000) as an example.1 Johnson invokes 
Alastair McIntyre’s (1984) conception of a practice, that is, an activity which realizes 
an internal good, a good which also functions as the regulatory principle governing 
the activity. Thus argumentation, in Johnson’s view, accomplishes or constitutes the 
internal good of manifest rationality, and the practice of argumentation ought to be 
oriented in all its aspects to achieve the good of manifest rationality. 
 What Schwed would invite Johnson (and others who similarly invoke a 
practice of argumentation) to take more seriously is McIntyre’s insistence that 
practices are historically situated. For any given practice, there was a time that it 
didn’t exist. It arose in particular circumstances, and will come to an end at some 
point as well. 
 If argumentation is a practice, it too must be deeply embedded in a tradition. 
It must have a historical origin which marks its contours. It must as Schwed puts it, 
“exist as a philosophical, cultural and social artifact, just as the rules of chess or 
abstract art do.” And that I take to be a fairly provocative claim. 
 Within what historical circumstances did the practice of argumentation 
arise? Schwed sketches a story in which argumentation first emerges as a practice 
together with the origins of democracy in Greece. This transformation fostered 
conditions in which autonomous citizens had to work together to make collective 
decisions even in the face of enduring, irresolvable disagreements. Gone were the 
sanctions of the gods and any sense of a single, right way of proceeding; man was 
the only measure of things, and men (and women) were inevitably diverse. 
Democratic decision-making under these circumstances required a form of 
discourse through which diverse citizens could bind themselves together into a 
working polity. 
                                                        
1 Further examples can be found in Dima Mohammed’s comprehensive review of functionalist 
theories, in this volume. 
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 I recognize and appreciate this origin myth--I recognize it because it is my 
own. Those of us who study rhetoric also look back to the invention of democracy in 
Athens as the environment in which our own art arose. And although I may be just 
being a booster for my own discipline, I think that rhetoric has claims superior to 
those of argumentation to being the central art of practical democracy. 
 The sophists, after all, were known as teachers of rhetoric, not as 
philosophers. While Protagoras himself claimed to be able to engage with Socrates 
in either short speeches (i.e., dialectic) or long speeches (i.e., rhetoric) when given 
the choice, he set out on a long speech--a mythos, a story, in fact, not an argument. 
The dissoi logoi or speeches on both sides of a question that Protagoras is credited 
with inventing are a rhetorical exercise, part of an extended curriculum that 
includes instruction in argumentation of course, but also instruction in appeals to 
emotion and character--ethos and pathos-- and the exploitation of the formal 
features of language to form a style appropriate to the occasion. On sum, the aim of 
the sophistic educational program was eloquence in a fullest sense, embracing but 
not reducible to argumentation in specific. 
 So one question to Schwed must be: Why can argumentation, not rhetoric, lay 
best claim to the classical democratic-humanistic tradition? Would identifying a 
different origin for argumentation--say, in the movement towards secularization in 
the Enlightenment--lead to a different conception of the art?  
 Finally, as Schwed points out, the practice of argumentation is at its base the 
transaction of un-overcomable disagreement. But as Schwed also points out, at the 
meta-level, argumentation theory is subject to the same, ever-enduring 
disagreements. As he says, theorists often project philosophical conceptions of 
epistemic merits onto the practice of argumentation---philosophical conceptions 
which carry with them all sorts of strengths and liabilities. We should indeed 
demand that any viable argumentation theory live up to the three principles of 
humanism he proposes--the ontological, epistemological, and ethical-political basic 
assumptions. But beyond this, we should not expect, Schwed argues, ever to resolve 
the meta-dispute over what makes an argument good.  
 So let me close with a speculation. If argumentation is a practice, then the 
practitioners presumably have a good idea of what they are doing. If so, then it 
might be possible to make some progress on our theories of argumentation by 
finding out what the practitioners themselves take to be the standards of argument 
goodness. The keynote address by Marianne Doury at this conference gave some 
examples of how empirical studies can reveal the norms actually in play within the 
practice of argumentation. Perhaps argumentation theorists should put aside 
disputes among epistemological conceptions for a while, and see where this kind of 
normative-descriptive work might lead? 
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